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This paper presents a discussion on the usage of a Balance Sheet Approach applied to 
developing countries. As an initial stage to conduct proper asset and liability 
management it discusses how this analytical tool could be used to increase the level of 
awareness from the debt managers’ point of view.   The conclusion is that, although 
gathering the data is often difficult, the rationale behind it is rather straightforward, 
which could be useful to help the authorities to mitigate public debt risks while 
formulating policies. 
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Public debt has long been associated with a heavy burden that constraints the 
government’s ability towards policy implementation, but also with the periodical 
occurrence of financial distress and economic crisis.   Governments usually raise funds 
to meet their financing needs using a range of securities and loans with different 
maturities, interest rates, and exchange rate structures. While doing that, debt managers 
need to consider various policy objectives to decide on the structure of the public 
liability portfolio The selection of specific financial instruments and their intersection 
with other sectors of the economy could exacerbate the fragilities on the underlying 
public sector balance sheet leading to instability and negatively affecting the real sector. 
 
Governments worry about their liabilities because of the financial and economic costs 
that result from an unexpected increase in debt servicing flows. This means that, in 
general, the emphasis is on the liability side and policy makers often have a narrow 
view of integrated asset and liability management (ALM). Nonetheless there are 
benefits in managing their liabilities more consistently with the characteristics of the 
available assets.  Because of the nature of government assets, the application of 
traditional ALM framework to the sovereign risk analysis is more complex. Many 
public assets lack the exogenous and explicit financial features that are at the core of 
risk identification and quantification in the traditional ALM framework. To highlight 
the different sources of risks Das, et al (2012a) argue that some countries face other 
financial risks associated with an aging population, structural issues that need reform 
(health and pension), contingent liabilities arising from systemically important financial 
or corporate sectors, and imbalances coming from sub-national entities. These risks, if 
materialized, could cause a significant fiscal and financial drain with a consequent fall 
in the country’s domestic absorption and potential output. 
 
Over time, various crisis-related events have shown that policy makers could no longer 
rely solely on a country's so-called flow variables (among them revenues, expenditures, 
imports, exports, and borrowing) as a guide to economic vulnerabilities. Financial 
soundness turned out to be more complicated than traditional macroeconomic 
imbalances which can be promptly identified.  Monitoring fiscal policy and its 
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framework is no longer sufficient to assess debt sustainability and its impacts on 
growth, inflation, and employment.   
 
It is unusual to see governments engaging into risk management activities of their assets 
and liabilities in an integrated way.  This paper will show some relevant aspects that 
could be effective for developing countries to take the initial steps in risk management, 
using the data available and reasoning on the risk nature residing on each part of their 
balance sheet.  Aside from this introduction, the following section connects ALM with 
Balance Sheet Approach (BSA); section 3 comments on how to build a balance sheet 
for the public sector; section 4 expands the analysis to a more comprehensive scope in 
order to include other sectors.  Section 5 presents a few examples and section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. ALM and the Balance Sheet Approach  
 
“Unlike mermaids and unicorns, sovereign balance sheets are real, but very rare.  They 
are also very valuable, for a range of reasons”.  With that peculiar comment, Ball, 
(2012) characterizes the importance of financial balance sheets in identifying hidden 
risks and unveiling financial imbalances that could unfold in a series of negative events 
affecting the sovereign fiscal position and public debt bond market.  Many sovereigns 
have been careless about their financial balance sheets or simply have lacked one, 
failing to prevent crisis and getting hampered when market financing conditions became 
more restrictive.   
 
This situation does not seem to be restricted only to developed countries, where 
complex economic structures make the identification of crises far more difficult than in 
smaller economies. Though the scenario has changed a lot in the past decade, emerging 
economies typically have shown weak revenue base and poor expenditure controls.  
This has contributed to explain why fiscal balances and public debt sustainability have 
been on the top of the agenda for most policy makers.  Because many emerging 
economies have also achieved more integration with the external sector and have 
developed their domestic markets, with greater financial intermediation, other sources 
of risks gained importance. For example, these risks may be originated in the banking 
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industry, non-financial corporate sector, state owned companies or in the external 
sector. 
 
The Balance Sheet Approach (BSA) provides important hints to snipe proper 
imbalances on sovereigns’ structure and potentially anticipates increases in overall 
riskiness. It can be seen as a comprehensive framework for looking at vulnerabilities 
that may emerge as a result of: (i) interactions between different debt types, and 
structures (maturity related) and the relevant assets for servicing these debts; (ii) 
linkages between sector balance sheets [IMF, (2004)].  However, most countries do not 
have a balance sheet, despite the recent efforts to provide guidance on that
2
.  For those 
countries which choose not to publish a balance sheet, questions would be raised about 
the status of their fiscal position.  There are clear incentives to publish a balance sheet 
because, if credible, the disclosure of government’s true fiscal stance could be 
reassuring to markets, resulting on financial relief on debt financing conditions. 
 
Other aspects could be related to the importance of balance sheets. Because it is an 
account of all government’s assets and liabilities and, therefore, provides a clearer 
snapshot of its financial strength and sustainability, it is more complete than only 
observing debt to GDP ratios.  It also elucidates that sovereigns have also important 
obligations other than traditionally reported debt (far more complicated to identify) and 
different asset structures from which to meet those liabilities.  It enhances transparency 
and guide investors to better analyze the issuers’ fiscal position, preventing the debtor to 
bear unnecessary costs. 
In addition, a balance sheet gives a sovereign a starting point for better managing its 
assets and liabilities.  This aspect must be highlighted for developing countries, which 
are the main object of this paper.  In fact, the BSA can be easily built, at least on a 
conceptual basis, in order to create the initial stages towards a more complete 
understanding of asset and liability management (ALM).  Therefore, sound accounting 
helps a government to use its assets more effectively insulating its balance sheet from 
intrinsic risks. 
                                                             
2 See IMF (2012). 
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On the policy front, cross-country experiences underscore the importance of temporary 
protection associated with strong public sector balance sheets.  Thus, they highlight the 
benefits of promoting appropriate hedge to improve risk allocation within and across 
sectors. They also support the strengthening of banking supervision, limit currency 
exposure and avoid maturity mismatches as will be explored in the following sections.  
Considering both private and public sectors, balance sheets show how robust liability 
management is useful in taming interest rate, currency, and rollover risks. 
 
Despite the fact that it seems straightforward to conceptually build a balance sheet, there 
is no consensus on how to do it.  There is an ongoing discussion on whether one should 
include only financial assets and liabilities rather than physical ones, such as real estate 
property.  Alternatively, one might also consider more intangible assets such as the 
present value of unexplored natural resources or cultural heritage.  Evidently, it does 
add complexity and instability to these concepts
3
. 
Should financial assets dominate the balance sheet?  To give vent to these ideas, one 
would assume that this is not necessarily true.  Thus, to illustrate, what is the Amazon 
Forest value?  How much is the South African shoreline worth? At which price could a 
public building be sold?  Indeed, it is very hard to assess the economic value of these 
national assets and incorporate them into a balance sheet.   Because of practical reasons 
and liquidity constraints of more tangible assets, sovereigns should avoid including the 
non-financial assets in the balance sheet, which is often described as a "snapshot of a 
sovereign financial condition". This guards a close relationship with corporate finance. 
 
A standard corporate balance sheet has three parts: assets, liabilities and ownership 
equity. The main categories of assets are usually listed first and typically in order 
of liquidity. Assets are followed by the liabilities. The difference between the assets and 
the liabilities is known as equity or the net assets or the net worth or capital of the 
company.  
 
                                                             
3
 According to Ball (2012), very few governments seek to manage their balance sheet such as 
corporations do, that is, complying with standard accounting rules.  New Zealand is one example. 
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A business operating entirely in cash can measure its profits by the sum of all bank 
balance plus any cash in hand at the end of the period. However, many businesses’ 
dividends are not paid immediately; companies often build up inventories and acquire 
buildings and equipment. Likewise, government activities accumulate assets and so they 
cannot, even if they want to, immediately turn these into cash at the end of each period. 
On other occasions, businesses and the public sector do not withdraw all their original 
capital and profits at the end of each period because they owe money to suppliers and 
the proprietors.  
The fact that, unlike companies, a sovereign cannot be put under foreclosure implies 
that legal disputes may occur in extraordinary circumstances making it a more difficult 
to include non-financial assets in the balance sheet.  In addition to the practical reasons 
aforementioned, one should only include financial assets that could be measured by 
reasonable methodologies. 
Hence, BSA cannot be easily reduced to a small set of readily comparable indicators 
that quantify vulnerabilities, and, by definition, it disregards off-balance sheet 
transactions. Nevertheless, there are papers demonstrating that available data, even 
where limited, providing useful insights into the nature of intersectoral vulnerabilities 
and the channels by which they are transmitted4.  
 
As previously stated, balance sheet represents an initial step.  Putting it together does 
not guarantee that a government will use the information effectively. Careful research 
reinforces a better assessment of the liability side of the public sector’s balance sheet 
and, when confronted to certain assets, allows authorities to reduce the level of debt 
toward sustainable levels.  For example, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) provide insights 
on the original sin - the inability to borrow in the long-term and in local currency - 
drawing attention to important differences between debt structures of advanced and 
some emerging economies.  Though many countries have been overcoming that 
shortfall
5
, it is still a very important restriction on the liability side. 
 
                                                             
4
 See IMF, (2004);  Das, Lu, Papaiaoannu, and Petrova, (2012) 
5 Countries like, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay gradually accessed the external capital market to issue 
securities denominated in their local currency, transferring exchange rate risk to the bond holder, thus, 
redeeming from the original sin.  See more on Papaioannou (2009). 
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Another example that relates to vulnerabilities on the liability side is the partial 
dollarization of the domestic economy and its embedded foreign exchange regime.  
Households’ holdings of dollar deposits, for example, can leave the banking system and 
the overall economy vulnerable to a self-reinforcing deposit run, as a shock to the 
portfolio preferences of domestic households prompts a shift out of domestic dollar 
deposits toward relatively safer international assets [IMF, (2004)]. The need to offset 
dollar deposits with domestic dollar-linked borrowings increases demand for foreign 
currency and significantly augments the exchange rate linked claims in the system.  In 
turn, adding severity on the impact of currency depreciation and setting the stage to the 
occurrence of a financial distress.  This sort of mismatches, both on corporate and 
public balance sheets, hinders monetary authorities’ (and policy makers, in general) 
tolerance towards currency movements.  If currency pressures are strong and persistent 
enough, the authorities will eventually run out of ammunition to intervene and avoid 
large movements on the exchange rate.   
 
One may realize the fragility and self-fulfillingness of this scheme.  Latin America 
displayed many examples of that situation, often associated with the usage of hard 
currency indexation to anchor inflationary expectations in stabilization plans devised in 
the 80’s and early 90’s.    Important examples will be further explored later, but some 
initial thoughts are useful.   Fiscal policies and financing current expenditures through 
public debt issuance was quite characteristic.  Because there was limited capacity to 
fund public debt obligations on local currency and longer maturities this outlook has 
proven particularly vulnerable to sudden capital outflows, sharp changes on investors’ 
confidence and underlying sources of financing. As a result, currency mismatches had 
arisen, maturity and interest rate risks had sharpened, leading public sector finances to 




Next, a few concepts and inputs will be discussed on how to build a balance sheet.  
First, emphasis is given to the sovereign and then an expanded balance sheet is 
presented aggregating other sectors and its cross linkages.  After that, a few country 
examples are presented.  
 
                                                             
6 See Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003); De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize (2003); Caballero and 




3. Building a Sovereign Balance Sheet for Sovereigns 
 
The BSA can be best understood as a comprehensive framework for scanning 
vulnerabilities that may emerge as a result of poor debt profile (composition), structure 
(maturity-related), and the relevant assets for servicing these debts besides the 
correlations between sectoral balance sheets. 
 
Rosemberg et al, (2005), proposes that ALM should focus on the continuous search for 
constraints that could emerge from different parts of the economy.  It reinforces the idea 
of interdependency across different sectors and tries to establish relations between risk 
exposure, transmission channels and policy responses.  Table 1 shows these relations. 
  
Table 1 – Balance Sheet and ALM Components 
 
              Source: Rosemberg at al, (2005) 
 
Moving towards a more operational level, the IMF – GFS (Government Finance 
Statistics) provides guidance on an internationally recognized statistical reporting 
framework, also advocating for simplicity on balance sheet for the public sector. Table 
2 shows that it would be interesting to have an inventory of both financial and non-
financial assets.  The latter could be somehow controversial and cumbersome to assess 
also with practical difficulties in pricing, as discussed below.  Moreover, it should be 
mentioned that one is looking to consider assets that could be used to offset the 
government’s obligations under specific conditions.  Therefore, it is vital to be 




Table 2 –GFS (IMF) definition for Government Balance Sheet 
 
Source: GFS/IMF.  Elaborated by the author. 
 
Refining the discussion above, Merton, (2007) introduces economic principles and 
intertemporal linkages in substitution of mere accounting ones.  This would include 
future revenues and expenditures, potentially giving more stability and predictability on 
the balance sheet. On the asset side, a country’s foreign reserves and long-term funds, 
such as a sovereign wealth fund, are part of sovereign assets. Cash, securities, loans, and 
receivables owned by the government are also sovereign assets. Equity in state-owned-
companies profits is also counted as sovereign assets in some cases. On the liability 
side, public debt is included irrespective of whether it is issued by the central bank or 













Financial Assets (Domestic and External) Liabilities (Domestic and External)
•Currency and Deposits •Currency and Deposits
















Table 3 – Customized Balance Sheet 
Source: Merton, (2007).  Elaborated by the author. 
 
From the analytical point of view, this conceptual
7
 balance sheet is the most relevant for 
policy analysis even if precise data is only available for the financial balance.  Note that 
Table 3 brings the concept of contingent liabilities, which is tagged as “a different 
animal”.  They are far more difficult to quantify, concern market analysts, government 
officials and can be defined as a potential source of government cash outflow, which 
has to be met through either increasing borrowing or selling assets [Currie and 
Velandia, (2002)]. They may be divided into explicit – already accounted for - and 
implicit ones – those clearly absorbable by the government, depending on the state of 
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 It is unusual to see published conceptual balance sheet mostly because of the challenges in estimating 
revenues and expenditures in present value, not to mention contingent liabilities. 
ASSETS LIABILITIES
Income (PV) Expenditures (PV)
•Taxes •Social and Economic Development
•Fees •Gov’t Administration
•Seignioriage •Loans
Balances of: Balances of:
•Cash •Monetary Base
•Currency Reserves •Gov’t Debt
•Investments (SWF, other) •Domestic
•State Owned Enterprises •External
•Infrastructure •Pension Liabilities
•Real State Contingent Liabilities
•Gov’t Commodities •Guarantees to Banks














Figure  1 – Examples of Contingent Liabilities 
 
Contingent Assets Contingent Liabilities 
Explicit 
Legal actions in process by the State Legal actions in process against the State 
Insurance purchased Guarantees issued by the State 
Contingent credit lines 
Government insurance schemes 
Ex: Deposit insurance, war-risk insurance 
Implicit 
Windfall gains 
Ex: Undiscovered natural resources that could be licensed or 
explored 
Banking failure 
Beyond deposit insurance 
Natural Disaster / Catastrophe 
Sub-National Government Defaults 
Elaborated by the author. 
 
Box 1 presents some examples of explicit contingent liabilities.  Das et al, (2012a) 
argue that contingent liabilities are more likely to be realized during economic 
recessions, when government borrowing requirements tend to be high. The size, 
extension and evaluation of contingent liabilities draw the attention of many economic 
agents, bringing a lot of discussion with both financial analysts and credit agencies.  
The later have recently modified the credit analysis framework to monitor the effects of 
those on government finances.  Ultimately, the crystallization of these liabilities 
depends on many assumptions, including probability of defaults and recovery rates, 
which are difficult to estimate. 
 
The next step is going to be important for didactic purposes and explains the benefits of 
incorporating other sectors that are quite helpful to derive a broader view of the 
economic structure.  An expanded balance sheet facilitates understanding how 
intersectoral relations could pressure public finances.  
 
Box 1– Important Aspects of Contingent Liabilities (CL) 
 
Contingent Liabilities are obligations that materialize conditional on the occurrence of a 
particular event. They are possible liabilities as a result of the state of the nature and its 
emergence depend on uncertain events that are often out of control of the sovereign.  One 
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important characteristic associated with CL is that it is hard to accurately quantify its value. 
 
It can be divided 8  into explicit CL, where the sovereign contractually recognizes its 
responsibility in covering the beneficiary under given circumstances, or implicit CL, where the 
sovereign is expected to assume the obligation for political, “moral” or practical reasons.  
Although it is a controverted topic, some sovereigns choose to include CL in their balance 
sheet and assess their value as an expected cost associated with a probability distribution and 
expressed in present value. 
 
Examples of explicit CL are given by credit guarantees given from the central to local 
governments; concessions of public services (airports, railways, roads) and legal disputes 
already decided by the court of law. 
 
As for implicit CL, some examples could be represented by the amount needed to support 
public enterprises that are considered strategic for the government (for instance, state owned 
oil companies), but also important corporates.  Also, the financial sector and the needs to 
correct its imbalances are often contingent and sizable.  Clear examples arise from the 
subprime crisis and the restructurings in the Swedish banking system in the 80’s and in the 
Brazilian in the mid 90’s. The associated costs were plenty more than what the government 
would have been willing the bear.  In other cases, like state run pension systems, the 
government is expected to fulfill its obligations  (for moral and political reasons) even though 
the funding scheme is structurally running on deficit. Finally, it has been observed that sub-
national borrowing may result in future debt restructuring and absorption by the federal 
government, a topic colored with high political sensitiveness. 
 
Some countries proactively monitor CL and prepare to buffer its effects if needed. In Chile, for 
example, there is an emergency fund, financed from fiscal sources, that is ready to be used 
upon natural seismic catastrophes.  In the UK, there is a team in the H.M. Treasury dedicated 
to monitor the government-backed securities issued by the banking industry (Banking Act, 
2009). If a default event occurs, then the Treasury covers it, whether if it goes well, they collect 
a fee for engaging in these operations. In fact, the British use market based CDS (Credit Default 
Swaps)  to assess the probability of default and come up with an estimate of the expected cost 
of  this CL. 
 
Because CL can have a significant impact on fiscal sustainability, they should also be included in 
DSA (Debt Sustainability Analysis).  There have been suggestions in the literature to identify 
and to create quantitative triggers for the materialization of CL, above all, in the banking 
industry [IMF, (2013b)]. The calibration of the resulting shocks should be tailored to country-
specific circumstances. 
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An explicit CL is usually the result of a contract (a guarantee, an insurance contract, etc.) that legally 
binds the Government to a payment (or multiple payments) if a given condition (or event) realizes. 
implicit CL allows the Government to decide after the triggering event, if it is necessary to make a 
payment and the amount of the payment.  By definition of implicit CL, the economic and/or social cost 






4. Building a Comprehensive Balance Sheet 
 
Financial vulnerabilities are often originated outside the government.  Allen, et al 
(2002), provides a comprehensive review of the literature on the role weak balance 
sheets could play in the genesis and evolution of a financial crisis. It focuses on the risks 
created by maturity, currency, capital structure mismatches and solvency. This 
framework draws attention to the vulnerabilities created by debt among residents 
(particularly those denominated in foreign currency) and it helps to explain how 
problems in one sector could spill over into other segments, eventually triggering an 
external balance of payments crisis. 
 
Despite all data weaknesses evolving the construction of a balance sheet, recent events 
illustrate how intersectoral linkages have deepened over time, especially regarding the 
financial sector.  This suggests that the BSA is becoming increasingly relevant for 
vulnerability analysis. 
 
Constructing an expanded balance sheet evolves putting together a matrix summarizing 
the asset and liability positions of the main sectors of the economy.  One should start 
with a step by step approach on the government side.  Initially, debt managers should 
list Central Government’s (Federal Government and Central Bank) assets and liabilities 
and then consider other government entities, such as Local Governments (States and 
Municipalities), Public Enterprises to form different levels and be in a position to 
understand broader sorts of risks and buffers.  Figure 2 shows the relation between 
government levels.  
 
Ideally, the analysis starts with a compilation of the data needed to fill the cells of that 
matrix for the public sector, private financial sector, and nonfinancial sectors vis-à-vis 
each other as well as the rest of the world. Data for the first two are often readily 
available, while data for the nonfinancial private sector is usually harder to obtain. 
Information on the international investment position or external data sources (such as 
the BIS or SDDS) can help in compiling the external position and deriving (as a 
residual) some of the unknown data elsewhere in the matrix [IMF, (2004)]. Although 
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data limitation is a common constraint, it does not impede analysts to have insights from 
those numbers. Where possible, the balance sheet approach can be augmented by 
including off-balance sheet items, such as contingent liabilities or derivatives. Further, 
linkages across economies could be examined to assess possible routes for contagion.   
 
Figure 2 – Relationship Between Government Levels 
 
Elaborated by the author 
 
Further exploring this idea, the IMF,(2004) suggests that the balance sheet could be 
broken down in four segments, (i) Public Sector, (ii) Financial Private Sector, (iii) Non-
Financial Sector, (iv) Rest of the World.  Then, it should be listed, for each of these, 
short-term liabilities – usually within a period of a year –  mid and long-term liabilities, 
both denominated in local and foreign currencies.  Equity should also be included as 
detailed in Table 4. 
 
Unlike traditional analysis, which is based on the examination of flow variables (such as 
current account and fiscal balance), the balance sheet approach focuses on the 
examination of stock variables in a country’s sectoral balance sheets and its aggregate  
(assets and liabilities) [Allen et al, (2002)].  A financial crisis occurs when there is a 
sharp downfall in demand for financial assets of one or more sectors: creditors may lose 
their faith in a country’s ability to earn foreign exchange to service the external debt, in 
the government’s ability to service its debt, in the banking system’s ability to meet 
deposit outflows, or in corporations’ ability to service its debt. It is interesting to see the 
pace these changes could assume.  In a matter of days, debt managers may face a 
complete different scenario upfront, severely affecting their financing conditions.  An 




Central Goverment (Federal 
Government + Central Bank) 
General Government (Federal+ Local 
Governments) 




liabilities. It must then either find the resources to pay off its debts or seek a 
restructuring
9
. Ultimately, a plunge in demand for the country’s assets leads to a surge 
in demand for foreign assets and/or for assets denominated in foreign currency. Massive 
outflows of capital followed by sharp depreciation of the exchange rate, large current 
account surplus, and deep recession that reduces domestic absorption are often the 
consequence to a sudden adjustment in investors’ willingness to hold a country’s 
accumulated stock of financial assets. 
 
Table 4 – Asset and Liability Position Across Sectors 
 
 
             Source: IMF, (2004) 
Note: To see a full description of the assets and liabilities for each group, plus aggregated data per region, see IMF 
(2004). 
 
An analytical framework that examines the balance sheets of an economy’s major 
sectors for maturity, currency, and capital structure mismatches helps to highlight how 
balance sheet problems in one sector can spill over into other sectors, and eventually 
                                                             
9 To explore this point, see Das, U., Papaioannou, M.,  Trebesch,C., (2012). 
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trigger an external balance of payments crisis. Indeed, one of the core arguments that 
emerge from this approach is that the debt among residents that create internal balance 
sheet mismatches also generate vulnerability to an external balance of payments crisis. 
The transmission mechanism often works through the domestic banking system. For 
instance, broad concerns about the government’s ability to service its debt, whether 
denominated in domestic or foreign currency, will quickly destabilize confidence in the 
banks holding this debt and leading to a deposit run [Allen et al, (2002)], [Krugman, 
(2000)].  Alternatively, a change in the exchange rate coupled with unhedged foreign 
exchange exposure in the corporate sector can undermine confidence in the banks that 
have lent to that sector. The run on the banking system can take the form of a 
withdrawal of cross-border lending by nonresident creditors, or the withdrawal of 
deposits by domestic residents.  
 
Though the description above fits very well onto a series of events over the past 20 
years, it no longer suffices given the incredible complexity of interconnections across 
different sectors.  Moreover, the complexity is proportional to the development of 
financial sector, market sophistication, deepness, regulation and openness.  Usually, mid 
to low income developing countries are in the early stages of that and allows BSA 
approach to be used more comfortably by analysts and researchers.  Contrasting to that, 
there are developing countries, such as Brazil, Turkey, Mexico and South Africa with 
reasonable complex economies and sophisticated domestic markets. The more complex 
the economy, the more limited is the usage of the BSA, calling for other approaches to 
conduct proper ALM. 
 
Before introducing a few country examples, an important issue arises regarding policy 
makers: how to effectively spot risk sources, such as contingent liabilities and poor debt 
structures, that would have impact on public finances?  As it has been mentioned, the 
financial sector has originated crisis in a number of occasions in different parts of the 
world.  Typically, the consequences of dealing with it share a couple of characteristics, 
such as large increases in public debt levels and costs.  In the leeway of the 2008’s 
crisis, a lot of criticism was raised towards ineffective oversight and efforts have been 
put in place to overcome that.  For instance, the IMF (2013b) has been working on 
policy papers exploring the main channels through which financial sector stress 
endangers public debt sustainability. This evolves documentation of current practices in 
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measuring and reporting risks from the financial sector to the sovereign and raising 
awareness of the need to integrate financial sector risks in the assessment of public debt 
sustainability.  To implement that, country authorities’ have been surveyed to input their 
current practices on how to identify, measure and monitor risks stemming from the 
financial sector and its implications on public debt. Box 2 describes how surveys could 
be useful in that sense. 
 
Box 2 – Applying Surveys to Identify Risks 
 
Surveys could be helpful in identifying potential sources of risks.  To cover that, the IMF 
(2013b) has designed a template to shed some light on the institutional framework under 
which financial sector risks are monitored and reported assessing their potential impact on 
public finances and debt.   
 
Attention is given to specific division of responsibilities for identifying, recording, and 
quantifying financial sector contingent liabilities that could potentially be transferred to the 
government balance sheet. Here, explicit guarantees given to the financial sector should be 
closely monitored by a single agency.  By the same token, it is important to knowledge which 
agency is responsible for quantifying and reporting potential CL associated with implicit 
guarantees (i.e. potential fiscal cost of bailing out financial institutions in the event of a crisis). 
Furthermore it investigates if there is a crisis resolution mechanism in place delineating each 
agency’s responsibilities in this process. 
 
A list of indicators must emerge to assess and monitor vulnerabilities in the financial sector.  
Examples suggest leverage and indebtedness ratios for households and corporates; credit risk 
indicators (non performing loans, coverage ratios, write-off); liquidity and market risk 
indicators (FX and interest rate risk exposures, derivatives positions; maturity mismatches, CDS 
spreads, YTM); external vulnerability (external funding reliance, asset exposure to foreign 
countries, credit lines availability). 
 
Evaluating public debt sustainability is also important.  A distinction between public debt 
sustainability analysis (DSA) and public debt portfolio analysis (DPA) should be kept in mind.  
Questions are made on the regularity, responsibility of DSA, and ultimately, its application.  
DPA is also present to see how do the structure and conditions of the financial sector affect 
the design of the public debt management strategy. It factors in its main influence on public 
debt management (e.g. regulatory requirements, liquidity conditions, concentration and liquid 
asset ratios, capacity of absorb government debt, etc.). 
 
Similar initiatives have been delivered by UNCTAD in Africa.  To illustrate, a survey has been 
used to conduct an assessment of current explicit and implicit contingent liabilities of the 
Government of Zambia with the indication of policy and organizational reforms aimed at 
strengthening the management of such. 
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The surveys should be answered by all agencies involved in identifying, measuring, and 
monitoring financial sector risks as well as risks to public debt sustainability, including 
the ministry of finance, the central bank, the local securities and exchange commission 
and other relevant agencies.  
    
 
5. Country Examples of Sovereign Balance Sheets 
 
As it was mentioned earlier, the BSA approach allows debt managers to have a 
comprehensive view of assets and liabilities in a snapshot.  It is of particular interest for 
low income developing countries which lack of a centralized debt management unit and 
often face institutional problems over the coverage of debt management.  Building a 
balance sheet for the public sector is already a challenging task and, scrutinizing  intra-
governmental relations in depth would most likely be at least a good managerial 
exercise for practioneers.  Adding other sectors to the balance sheet is a step forward 
which very few countries are up to take. In this sense, this section will focus on the 
public sector examples and briefly describe how the BSA approach has been used to 
sparkle ALM analysis and concepts in Ethiopia, Argentina, Bolivia and how it was 




According to the National Bank of Ethiopia
10
, the country has experienced steady 
growth for a decade, averaging 11.2% p.y. from 2003-2010. Economic growth has been 
supported by robust export growth and public enterprise investments.  One of the main 
policies has been the contraction of base money, with NBE (National Bank of Ethiopia) 
ceasing to finance the budget and sales of foreign exchange. As a result of this foreign 
exchange intervention, gross official foreign reserves have declined to under two 
months of import coverage. The budget execution has been prudent, but increased 
domestic credit to public enterprises has been providing fiscal impulse, potentially 
imposing risks to the balance sheet.  
                                                             
10NBE Annual Report http://www.nbe.gov.et/publications/annualreport.html  
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Having that said, it will be shown how an initial simple balance sheet was built for 
Ethiopia in conceptual terms with some specific data.  Supposedly, this was meant to 




The institutional set up in Ethiopia basically consists on the monetary authority –
National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) – running the monetary policy and operating in the 
interbank market on a daily basis, but also issuing Treasury Bills.  These are tendered 
with 4 maturities, 28, 91, 182, 364 days.  Any financial institution can take part in the 
auctions subjected to a minimum amount. NBE is also responsible for banking 
supervision. 
On the other side, there is the MOFED – Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development – which allocates budget, administrates public finances, formulates 
development policies and mobilizes external resources.  With limited access to the 
market, most of the funding comes from external sources.  Hence, contractual debt with 
multilateral institutions is usually the type of debt managed by the Ministry.    
Clearly, there is an institutional arrangement that does not favor the issuance of 
government bonds other than those conducted by NBE.  There is not a term structure 
cultivated by the Treasury, which is set within the MOFED, to issue bonds seeking to 
finance government’s expenditures.  Contrasting to that, NBE has been consistently 
keeping interest rates below inflation rates and there is heavy monetary financing by the 
public sector.  In addition to this, financing largely relies on bank credit. 
Table 5 shows a proposed qualitative balance sheet to the Ethiopian government, built 
after discussions held with the MOFED and the NBE.  The underlying idea was to build 
a description of the main financial assets that are under the influence of these two key 
institutions inside the government and induce the respective staff to name the type of 
risk exposure adherent to each asset or liability, for didactic purposes. 
In this sense, another institutional aspect that emerged is the quasi-fiscal apparatus used 
by the Central Government to promote investment.  There is a set of funds financed and 
managed by the public sector which are bounded to other government agencies policies 
                                                             
11
 The BSA was introduced in an UNCTAD’s mission on Dec-12 on Assets and Liability Management and 
Debt Portfolio Analysis Workshop. 
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or MOFED.  Though the precise nature and operational structure under those needed 
further clarification, it eventually became clear that some of the funds were susceptible 
to commodity risk.   
Concessions and investment schemes are also on the government’s radar, but the format 
these initiatives will assume is yet to be designed. The program includes, airports, 
railways, roads, housing and are subjected to line ministries policies.  Some of the 
financing would come from the issuance of debt with credit institutions and are 
subjected to interest rate risk for the government.   
Another interesting aspect that appeared in the discussion was the relationship with 
regional governments.  Central government has provided loans to local governments 
and has guarantees against those entities.  In case of non-performing loans, it can arrest 
legal transfers towards up the credit owed by them.  In theory, this mechanism was 

















Source: MoFED, NBE, UNCTAD.  Note: This table does not represent an official depiction of the Ethiopian Balance Sheet and was 
put together solely for didactic purposes within a specific context. 
On the liability side, standard domestic and external debts are included.  Special 
attention was given to the external debt due to balance of payments problems observed 
in the past and the shortage of international reserves.  Currently, it is clear that FX-
reserves surpassed foreign currency liabilities by more than three times.  Again, these 
are not official estimates and were built only for didactic objectives of illustrating how 
an initial step could be made to introduce the balance sheet for the government.  
 
                                                             
12 Qualitative list proposed by MoFED, NBE and author’s comments.   
Asset Liability
Description Risk institutions Description Risk institutions
INTERNATIONAL RESERVE FUND PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT
    Cash Foreign Currencies  FX risk NBE Central Gov't Debt
    Balance with Foreign Correspondents  FX risk NBE     Domestic Debt
    Foreign Securities FX risk / interest rate NBE            Direct Advances refinancing risk MoFED
    Gold Commodity price risk NBE            Bonds refinancing risk MoFED
    SDR FX risk NBE/MoFED            T-Bills
refinancing risk/
interest rate MoFED
    PRGF-HIPC Assistance (IMF) FX risk NBE




           IDB
INVESTMENT FUNDS Comodity risk MoFED            IMF
    Water Fund WWCE            Bilateral
    Sugar Fund sugar dev't co.            Other Multilateral
    Railway Fund railway co.            Private Banks
    Road Fund road authority State Owned Companies - SOE
    Other Funds To     Domestic Debt
        External Debt
CONCESSIONS Interest rate risk Line Ministries
    Airports REGIONAL GOV'T
    Ports     MOFED subsidies on Local Gov't loans
    Roads
    Railways CONTINGENT LIABILITIES
    Land lease     DBE loans to the public DBE credit risk
    Rental Housing NBE
MARKETABLE SECURITIES
(receivables) Market risk MoFED
NATIONAL BANK OF ETHIOPIA -NBE - 
Relationship with the Central Gov't NBE
   Treasury SINGLE ACCOUNT held at the NBE
RIGHTS OVER THE DBE -other official financial 
institutions Depends on the loan MoFED NBE own Balance Sheet
    Monetary Base (M1) liabilities
    Repurchase Agreements (if any) liabilities
REGIONAL GOV'T     NBE Credits to financial institutions assets
    MOFED relations with Local Government MOFED            NBE Bills to DBE (5y) assets
    MOFED securities on NBE assets
NATIONAL BANK OF ETHIOPIA -NBE - 
Relationship with the Central Gov't MOFED
   Treasury SINGLE ACCOUNT held at the NBE
   NBE Bills to DBE
    Domestic Debt
           Direct Advances MoFED





Bolivia has been working on initiatives to develop a risk management analysis after a 
debt relief that has cut debt levels and stabilized it to around 31% of GDP in 2012.  
External debt represents around 48% of total debt and is mostly described by 
concessional loans with multilaterals, bilateral organisms and, more recently, by a 10-
years bond issued in the external market.  Hence, the debt is relatively long and the 
costs are not high.  
 
However, from the risk management perspective, the external debt would represent a 
risk if the government were not building up FX-reserves.  Most of the external inflows 
come from exports of hydrocarbons that have grown steadily in the past few years.  
Because the maturity profile has a sizable concentration in the next ten years, specially 
in 2022 (due to a 10y bond issued abroad), the government has been seeking to fund it 
domestically or through other external sources, preparing themselves from a transition 
period towards the end of concessional borrowing. 
 
The BSA could be useful to jump start the risk analysis of the government financial 
stance and to shed some light in other sources of potential volatility.  Government 
revenues are heavily dependent on the commodities cycle and the public sector has been 
building international reserves also to buffer against an abrupt downturn in hydrocarbon 
prices.  Some risks are posed in that respect because there is a fixed exchange rate 
regime, which maintenance could deplete the level of official reserves under a stressful 
scenario. 
 
Another aspect that the BSA could provide useful insights is the presence of contingent 
liabilities arising from various sources.  For example the fideicomiso- financial 
arrangements dedicated to fund infrastructure and other investment or expenditures that 
are not fully recorded in the government accounts.  Though some fideicomiso are on-
the-budget, its investment plans are still to be better detailed and may well represent a 
source of liability that could be absorbed by the public sector, if the projects are not as 
good as initially estimated.  Further investigation must be done in this area to clarify on 
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the nature of those financial schemes.  Hence, there have been initial attempts to build a 






The Argentinean crisis in 2001-2002 is well documented in the literature
13
. Although 
the crisis rooted from deep macroeconomic imbalances, it also derived from weaknesses 
in the private sector’s balance sheets. A lot of attention has been put on the 
inconsistencies between Argentina’s fiscal and exchange rate policies, its difficulties to 
promote fiscal adjustments during a prolonged recession, the weaknesses in the public-
sector balance sheet, and the government’s large stock of foreign-currency debt [IMF, 
(2004)]. On top of this, bank and corporate sector balance sheet mismanagement 
exacerbated FX-rate exposure adding critical volatility to the system.  Then, balance 
sheet approach was used in helping to explain how vulnerabilities in the private sector 
augmented the underlying weaknesses in Argentina’s public sector, and also contributed 
to intensify the crisis in 2001–02
14
.   
From that period to the present, the Argentinean government has accessed the external 
market intermittently, where funding has been relying mostly on domestic sources.  
Recently, efforts have been made to come up with an ALM approach, considered to be a 
more complete risk analysis tool available to the Public Sector.  In turn, this would 
allow authorities to have a broader and more integrated view of both sides of their 
balance sheet.  
Aside from providing information and enabling analysts to have another perspective of 
the fiscal side, ALM facilitates the design of financing strategies adapting the 
characteristics of financial liabilities to the assets at hand, with positive pay offs on debt 
sustainability, risk perception and, eventually, favoring cost reduction. 
                                                             
13
 See Roubini, (2001); Goldenstein and Turner,(2004). 
14 A complete description of the precedents and unfolding events can be found in IMF, (2004). 
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By the end of 2011, the Argentinean DMO
15
 put together a balance sheet for the public 
sector.  As it has been described, the balance sheet considers only financial assets and 
liabilities.  From the asset side, it includes financial instruments (cash deposits, loans, 
securities, receivables), gold deposits, SDDS.  They can either be denominated in book 
values, or mark-to-market if such. 
The liabilities are evaluated as the difference between the original nominal value and 
the amortization (with accrued interest).  Arguably, this would bring less volatility to 
the liability side when compared to mark-to-market approach.   
Table 6 displays the results as of Dec-11 in notional and risk-related terms.  The public 
sector financial net worth is negative in AR$ 212 bn (about 11.5% of GDP).  This is a 
result of the accumulation of AR$ 405 bn in assets and AR$ 617 bn in liabilities.    The 
sheet is clustered in non-financial public sector (SPNNF) items, local governments 
(state and municipalities) and monetary authority (BCRA). 
Table 6 – Balance Sheet for the Argentinean Public Sector  
 
Source: ONCP, Wright (2013). 
 
Some points can be highlighted.  The overall net worth is a consequence of the central 
government net debtor condition in AR$ 240 bn.  The majority of that debt (14% GDP) 
                                                             
15 ONCP- Oficina Nacional de Crédito Público .  See ONCP, (2012) 
Asset AR$ mn Liability AR$ mn
405,155.0 617,070.0
Description Risk institutions amount Description Risk institutions amount AR$ mn % GDP
Sub Total 167,530.0 Sub Total 407,741.0 (240,211.0) -13.0%
    Deposits in AR$ fixed rate 130,512   Central Gov't Debt
    Finacial Trusts fixed rate 4,897    National Debt fixed rate 1,252 110,319 6.0%
    Mutual Funds fixed rate 4,798    National Debt fixed rate 32,981
    Cash (Receivables) fixed rate SPNNF 2,533 SPNNF
    Other fixed rate 1,812
    Equity floating rate 16,462    National Debt floating rate 41,940 (25,478) -1.4%
---- Inflation-linked    National Debt inflation-linked 63,854 (63,854) -3.5%
    Deposits in FX FX-rate 6,516    National Debt FX-rate 200,409 (261,198) -14.2%
   National Debt FX-rate 67,305
Sub Total 858.0 Sub Total 42,726.0 (41,868.0) -2.3%
    Deposits of states*and Municipalitiesfixed rate 858     Local Gov't Debt (Provincias) fixed rate 535 323 0.02%
---- floating rate Local Gov't ---- floating rate Local Gov't 5,741 (5,741) -0.3%
---- inflation-linked ---- inflation-linked 329 (329) -0.02%
---- FX-rate ---- FX-rate 36,121 (36,121) -2.0%
Sub Total 236,767.0 Sub Total 166,603.0 70,164.0 3.8%
    Rights for Repos fixed rate 25,903     Obligations for Repos fixed rate 24,437 (37,827) -2.1%
    LEBAC fixed rate 39,293
---- floating-rate     NOBAC floating-rate Central Bank (BCRA) 44,889 (44,889) -2.4%
    Loans to the Financial System inflation-linked Central Bank (BCRA) 2,074 ---- inflation-linked 2,074 0.1%
    Contributions to International OrganismsFX-rate 9,225     Obligations with International OrganismsFX-rate 5,230 150,806 8.2%
    FX-Reserves FX-rate 199,565     Counterpart of C to OI FX-rate 3,899
    Current Accounts on Foreign CurrencyFX-rate 24,621
    Other FX-rate 24,234
Memo AR$ mn Net Worth -211,915.0 -11.5%
GDP-linked securities 25,254
in local currency 4,057
in foreign currency 21,197
Holdouts 12,840





is foreign currency linked, while 1.4% of GDP is in floating rate and, because of earlier 
debt exchange occurred in the past, around 3.5% of GDP emerged as inflation-linked 
debt.  Regional governments also represent an important source of indebtedness (2.3% 
of GDP)
16
.  Central Bank differs from the other official entities and it holds a positive 
net worth of 3.8% GDP. 
More importantly, Table 7 resumes the type of exposure observed in the balance sheet, 
which allows one to prompt on the mismatches instantly. Clearly, foreign exchange rate 
exposure across the public sector pops up and raises the need of further investigation on 
the structure of those liabilities, with possible policy implications. Because of instability 
in international liquidity, a slowdown in external trade, restricted access in the 
international capital market and the challenges in maintaining/accumulating foreign 
exchange reserves, the referred mismatch may be even more severe and this type of 
exercise could serve as a side indicator for the authorities. 
 









AR$ mn 72,815 -76,108 -62,109 -146,513 
% GDP 4.0% -4.1% -3.4% -8.0% 
             Source: ONCP, Wright (2013). 
 
As it has been argued, the balance sheet approach is more complete when other key 
sectors are included, as counterparty risk may also arise from the interrelation across 
sectors.  Nonetheless, ONCP has managed to map out a great deal of the current asset-
liability structure to the public sector, despite partial data missing on local government, 
and has given an important initial step in risk management.  Subsequently, it adopted 
another approach towards further analysis on debt sustainability and then introduced 
stochastic financial analysis combined to optimal portfolio theory to derive debt 





                                                             





The Brazilian economic stabilization process has nearly completed two decades.  After 
years of price instability, there were automatic indexation schemes to protect savings 
and investments value, which, in turn, fueled the next round of price adjustments, self-
fulfilling expectations on rising inflation, resulting in a vicious cycle.  
In this context, there were underdeveloped term structures, incapable to distribute 
intertemporal wealth through traditional market instruments.  Instead, an overnight rate 
culture widespread on the economy where financial instruments were concentrated in 
the very short term.  To remark that, between 1990 and mid-1995, there was virtually no 
fixed rate bonds in the domestic debt portfolio, while overnight linked bonds and FX-
linked bonds dominated the federal debt portfolio. Despite the success of the 
stabilization plan in bringing prices to acceptable levels (compared to other stable 
countries) it did not change the local financial community’s short-term preferences of 
securities and investments linked to the overnight rate.   
The ensuing maintenance of high short term interest rates preserved their attractiveness. 
There wasn’t any other type of instrument that could provide, simultaneously, high 
return, low risk, and daily liquidity.  The so called LFT – Treasury floating rate bills - 
naturally became an important source of public funding, especially in moments of high 
risk aversion.  
The term structure remained underdeveloped 17  as of 1999-2000.  Despite mild 
improvements in macroeconomic fundamentals, direct indexation to monetary policy 
reference rate was a source of high market risk for the public debt, in an illiquid bond 
market, characterized by shallowness and near term concentration. 
As market sentiment deteriorated during 2002, about 90% of the overall federal debt 
was linked either to the foreign exchange or to the floating rate.  Gradually, the DMO 
was able to swap its structure by issuing fixed rate and inflation-linked bonds18.  Figure 
3 shows a historical view of that change.    
                                                             
17
 In parallel, the issuance of external debt in the foreign capital market gained importance as a funding 
source. 
18
 For further examination of this type of strategy, see Papaioannou, (2009), Brazilian National Treasury 
website- Debt Reports. 
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Figure 3 – Brazilian Federal Public Debt Profile
 
Source: Brazilian National Treasury 
This BSA example will show how the Brazilian government was able to systematically 
adopt a transition strategy to revert a liability side worrisome situation where roll-over, 
interest and foreign exchange risk agglutinated in the debt portfolio, in parallel with 
asset accumulation, especially those regarding external reserves.  Even though a more 
sophisticated framework was used in order to control the debt and to establish a long 
term financing strategy, early stages of risk management used BSA to disseminate the 
need to tackle the deteriorated debt profile and to sediment long term objectives towards 
a more stable and less risky debt composition.    
The usefulness of this type of exercise can be described as the following: the approach 
aimed at analyzing the net mismatch between the federal government’s assets and 
liabilities from the viewpoint of various bonds types, as well as associated maturity and 
cash flow. It was an additional reference debt managers used for medium and long-term 
planning. For that time being, this instrument was essentially indicative. 
 As of 2002-4, the government sequenced a series of measures to highlight the necessity 
to promote changes in debt outlook, consisting in putting together and comparing the 
most relevant data on assets and liabilities managed by the central government. To 
illustrate, floating rate liabilities were exceeding assets in around 12% of GDP in 2004.  



























































































































































































Fixed Rate Inflation Linked Floating Rate Exchange Rate
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diminish this type of security (LFT) in the portfolio was reinforced. It could also be 
drawn from the table that inflation linked assets surpassed similar liabilities in about 1% 
of GDP. It became clear this issue had to be addressed and debt strategies were devised 
to explore that. 
 
Table 8 – Brazil – Illustrative Balance Sheet for the Central Government - 2004 
 
Source: Brazilian Central Bank, Brazilian National Treasury 
 
The table above already incorporate the advances occurred throughout 2003 and 2004, 
which resulted in an improved balance sheet. Similar tables were constructed to monitor 
those items periodically.  To unfold this point, because of rapid accumulation of FX-
INDEX RESPONSIBILITY ASSET BRL bn INDEX RESPONSIBILITY LIABILITY BRL bn
MISMATCH
(BRL bn) % GDP




LINKED 407.55 42.92 0.99 
Whosale Price 
Index NT
Contract with States and 
Municipalities 315.22
Whosale Price 
Index NT NTN-C 58.73




Privatization Loan to Rio 
de Janeiro -BANERJ 10.9
NT Royalties - States 8.96
Consumer Price 
Index NT NTN-B 332.62
NT Other Whosale Price Index 65.38
FX-LINKED 407.32 FX-LINKED 103.08 304.24 7.00 
NT
Contract with State 
Companies 6.32 USD NT Brady Bonds 0.22
Other NT Globals 70.3
NT Contracts 22.78
CB FX-SWAP 0 EUR NT Euro Bonds 9.78
CB Net FX Reserves 401
FLOATING 
RATE 200.09 FLOATING RATE 748.47 (548.38) (12.62)
Selic NT Contracts 20.95 Selic NT LFT
TR NT Agreements 35 NT Other 507.66
TJLP NT













TJLP NT Securities 1.27
FIXED RATE 18.28 FIXED RATE 836 (817.72) (18.82)
NT Diverse Programs 18.28 NT LTN 246
NT NTN-F 210






reserves and concomitant reduction in external debt and local FX-linked debt, currency 
risk was sharply mitigated in those years. In that sense, there has been concomitant asset 
accumulation by the Central Bank, giving leeway to the Treasury to redeem local debt 
exposed to foreign currency.   It is also worthy to mention that, as previously indicated, 
because the federal government had assets linked to inflation indexes against local 
governments, it gave vent to put in place a debt issuance strategy to explore this 
segment improving diversification and lengthening debt structure.     
 
It is important to emphasize that this was a simple exercise conducted by the DMO to 
illustrate the imbalances perpetrated in the debt structure.  It also permitted to see the 
important buffers that diversification could yield if properly explored in formal debt 
strategies.  Eventually, the Brazilian National Treasury launched other analytical 
frameworks to conduct risk management in a more rigorous and complete way 
calibrating costs and risk under stochastic scenarios
19
.  Eventually, other market 
advances were introduced and debt structure achieved a much more comfortable 
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Table 9 – Balance Sheet into perspective – Case Studies 
Country Risk Exposure / Diagnosis Strategy used to Mitigate 
Risks 
Comments 
Ethiopia 1. FX-rate risk on External Debt contracts as 
the most important source of funding.  
2. Interest rate risk due to the concessions 
financing scheme – issuance of floating rate 
debt. 
3. Contingent Liability risk – Loans to Local 
Gov’t 
1. Initiatives to build up liquidity 
cushion on hard currency 
2. Strategy yet to be defined 
3. Creating mechanisms to block 
cash transfers from the Central 
Gov’t to Local Gov’t as 
guarantees. 
 There are 
important 
imbalances in the 
assets vs liabilities 
accounts.  
 As for risk (3), the 
blocking 
mechanisms have 
yet to be tested in 
an event of non-
performing loan. 
Bolivia 1. FX-rate risk on External Debt – 
concessional loans and a single 10y 
outstanding Global Bond. FX-reserves are 
sizable and constitute a buffer for those 
liabilities.   
2. Commodity-risk – High dependence on 
hydrocarbon exports to create economic 
dynamism and to generate revenues 
3. Contingent Liability risk – Fideicomiso 
funding investment projects without proper 
evaluation. 
1. Accumulation of FX-reserves 
have been important to offset 
the risks.   
2. Strategy yet to be defined – 
ideally to diversify the 
economy. 
3. Attempts to bring all 
fideicomiso to the budget and 
define methodologies to assess 
the projects to be funded by 
this channel.  
 Still,  a fixed FX-
rate regime may 
represent a risk to 
the balance sheet 
under and adverse 
external shock or 
downturn in 
commodity prices. 
Argentina 1. FX-rate risk is the most important source of 
exposure.  External Debt is sizable 
compared to hard currency denominated 
assets.  
1. Debt managers have been 
making efforts to shrink FX-
linked debt while increasing 
the share of floating rate and 
inflation linked debt in the 
local market. 
 Restricted access 
to the international 
capital market, 
decrease in foreign 
trade (exports) 
have hindered the 
capacity to roll 
over the 
outstanding debt 
and to build up 
FX-reserves . 




issue securities in 
the local market. 
 However, BSA 
have been helpful 
to compile 
information about 
the Public Sector 
financing structure 
and contributed to 
assess the correct 
risk perception and 
to design suitable 
debt strategies. 
Brazil 1. FX-rate risk was off-set while FX-reserves 
were built on.   
2. Inflation-linked debt found a natural hedge 
on the asset side 
3. Floating rate debt has not been matched 
4. Some assets are not liquid.  
1. Debt redemptions and 
buybacks were put in place. 
2. Central Gov’t held inflation 
linked assets (cash flows) 
against States and 
Municipalities 
3. Floating rate liabilities have 
moved closer to long term 
optimal levels. 
4. Studies have been made to 
securitize some of the illiquid 




jump start a 
clear strategy 
moving from 
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Despite all the benefits described in this article, the BSA approach holds a few short 
comings [IMF, (2004)].  To begin with it should be seen as a conceptual framework to 
oversee the types of exposure a given sovereign is bounded to, assessing its 
vulnerabilities and related policy options, given the prevailing political and economic 
environment.  As pointed earlier, it is very hard to use BS to do cross country 
comparisons, as opposed to other traditional economic indicators. 
 
It does not include off-balance sheet transactions, a topic that has definitely gained 
importance in the recent past. The subprime crisis revealed the banking industry devised 
instruments to unload important operations from their balances which allowed them to 
increase their leverage on a large scale, posing significant risks to the overall system.  It 
has been demonstrated that in some countries, such transactions could be used to 
implicitly increase the riskiness of the government balance sheet, posing moral hazard 
issues on the discussion on whether the central government should support those sectors  
[Lewis, (2010)] and [IMF (2004)]. 
 
A complete assessment of underlying risks needs to consider the probability distribution 
of relevant shocks.  Nonetheless, it is very hard to associate a distribution adherent to 
more realistic hypothesis due to the abnormal nature of shocks20.
 
 For instance, under a 
fixed or pegged exchange rate regime, a situation of clear and meaningful misalignment 
would raise the level of concern related to the vulnerabilities pointed out by the BSA.  
Thus, it would require urgency from policy makers to intervene in anticipation of 
triggering events. 
 
Policy makers should keep in mind that the BSA is an useful framework to minimize 
financial risks while adjusting imbalances on the economic structure.  Such an approach 
                                                             
20 See Taleb, (2007). 
33 
 
could be used to evaluate the soundness of the financial system, currency and maturity 
composition of external debt and optimal reserve accumulation.  Noteworthy, this may 
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